Case 1:24-cr-00024-JLT-SKO Document 26 Filed 09/13/22 Page 1 of 5

1 2 3 4 5 6 7	PHILLIP A. TALBERT United States Attorney KIMBERLY A. SANCHEZ Assistant United States Attorney 2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401 Fresno, CA 93721 Telephone: (559) 497-4000 Facsimile: (559) 497-4099 Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America	
8 9 10		TATES DISTRICT COURT RICT OF CALIFORNIA
11 12 13 14 15	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ETHAN ANDREW EVANS TINDUKASIRI, Defendant.	CASE NO. 1:22-MJ-00117-SAB 1:22-MJ-00114-SAB STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER DATE: September 16, 2022 TIME: 2:00 p.m. COURT: Hon. Barbara A. McAuliffe
16 17 18 19 20	to continue the preliminary hearing until Novemlengaged in discussions and further investigation,	on September 16, 2022. The parties agree and stipulate per 18, 2022. Defense counsel has continued to be and needs additional time to conclude that process.
21 22 23	courthouse in June 2021, recognized the continue video or teleconference court appearances in vari	ed public health emergency, continued to authorize fous cases, and noted the court's continued ability under
242526	other matters, excluding time under the Act. On which "authorized the use of videoconference an	
27 28		California." This and previous General Orders highlight ns related to COVID-19. Pursuant to F.R.Cr.P. 5.1(c) ater than 14 days after initial appearance if the

Case 1:24-cr-00024-JLT-SKO Document 26 Filed 09/13/22 Page 2 of 5

defendant is in custody," unless the defendant consents and there is a "showing of good cause", or if the defendant does not consent and there is a "showing that extraordinary circumstances exist and justice requires the delay." Here, the defendant consents and there is good cause.

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act's end-of-justice provision "counteract[s] substantive openendedness with procedural strictness," "demand[ing] on-the-record findings" in a particular case. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). "[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no exclusion under" § 3161(h)(7)(A). *Id.* at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. *Id.* at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record "either orally or in writing").

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which *Zedner* emphasizes as both mandatory and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, 631 and 652 require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if "the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless "the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." *Id*.

The General Orders exclude delay in the "ends of justice." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens' eruption. *Furlow v. United States*, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. *Id.* at 767-68; *see also United States v. Correa*, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing *Furlow* to exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules.

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date for the preliminary hearing. *United States v. Lewis*, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial continuance must be "specifically limited in time").

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

- 1. By previous order, this matter was set for preliminary hearing on September 16, 2022.
- 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the preliminary hearing until **November 18, 2022, at 2:00 p.m.** and to exclude time between September 16, 2022, and November 18, 2022, under Local Code T4.
 - 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
 - a) The parties are discussing and conducting further investigation into preindictment matters, and need additional time to conclude.
 - b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, conduct further investigation, and discuss charges with the government.
 - c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
 - d) The government does not object to the continuance.
 - e) Pursuant to F.R.Cr.P. 5.1(c) and (d), a preliminary hearing must be held "no later than 14 days after initial appearance if the defendant is in custody," unless the defendant consents and there is a "showing of good cause". Here, the defendant consents and there is good cause as set forth herein.
 - f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in an indictment or trial within the original dates prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

Case 1:24-cr-00024-JLT-SKO Document 26 Filed 09/13/22 Page 4 of 5

1	g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161
2	et seq., within which an indictment must be filed and within which a trial must commence, the
3	time period of September 16, 2022 to November 18, 2022, inclusive, is deemed excludable
4	pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a
5	continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that
6	the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the
7	defendant in a speedy indictment/trial.
8	4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the
9	Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which an
10	indictment must be filed and a trial must commence.
11	IT IS SO STIPULATED.
12	
13	Dated: September 13, 2022 PHILLIP A. TALBERT
14	United States Attorney
15	/s/ KIMBERLY A. SANCHEZ
16	KIMBERLY A. SANCHEZ Assistant United States Attorney
17	
18	Dated: September 13, 2022 /s/ CAROL ANN MOSES
19	CAROL ANN MOSES Counsel for Defendant
20	ETHAN ANDREW EVANS TINDUKASIRI
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	

Case 1:24-cr-00024-JLT-SKO Document 26 Filed 09/13/22 Page 5 of 5

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	

25

26

27

28

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED that the preliminary hearing is continued from September 16, 2022, to **November 18, 2022, at 2:00 p.m. before Magistrate Judge Sheila K. Oberto**. Time is excluded pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 13, 2022 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE